MOGADISHU, Somalia – The notion that the Trump administration might consider negotiations with Al-Shabaab is more than a provocative headline—it’s a potential geopolitical earthquake for the Horn of Africa. Raised by a former U.S. State Department advisor, the idea signals a possible dramatic shift from nearly two decades of entrenched American counterterrorism policy, posing urgent questions about the future of one of the world’s most protracted conflicts.

Hamza Warfa, a former senior advisor to the State Department under President Biden, has voiced this emerging viewpoint. In a recent interview with Universal Somali TV, Warfa argued that the United States’ exclusive military strategy has reached its limits.

“There are signs that talks could begin now,” he said, suggesting that a political settlement may be the only viable path forward. His remarks hint at behind-the-scenes discussions that could mark the beginning of a significant policy realignment—one rooted in the growing realization that a definitive military victory remains out of reach.

Should such a shift materialize, it would compel Washington to rethink its definitions of victory and failure in what has become America’s longest-running shadow war. But critical questions remain: Is dialogue with Al-Shabaab truly realistic? What would such engagement look like? And where would it leave the Somali government?

What it means: Acknowledging a stalemate

At its core, the contemplation of talks is a tacit admission that the existing U.S. policy—a nearly two-decade-long campaign of airstrikes and military support—has failed to achieve its ultimate goal: the definitive defeat of Al-Shabaab.

A shift from eradication to containment: It would signal a monumental change in U.S. counterterrorism strategy. Instead of seeking to destroy the group, the focus would pivot to neutralizing the direct threat it poses to the U.S. homeland and its interests. This is a pragmatic, if deeply controversial, move away from ideological confrontation toward conflict management.

The “endless war” doctrine in Action: This potential move aligns perfectly with President Donald Trump’s well-documented desire to extricate the U.S. from costly, seemingly unwinnable foreign military engagements. As with the withdrawal from Afghanistan, the primary objective would be to end American involvement, even if it means negotiating with a long-standing adversary.

Legitimizing the insurgency: For Al-Shabaab, direct talks with a superpower would be a massive propaganda victory. It would elevate them from a “terrorist group” to a legitimate political and military actor on the world stage, a status they have long craved.

Is it possible? Hurdles and precedents

The path to negotiation is fraught with obstacles, but it is not impassable.

The legal barrier: The primary hurdle is Al-Shabaab’s designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in 2008. This law prohibits the U.S. government from providing “material support,” and negotiations could be considered such. However, the executive branch has significant leeway in foreign policy. A presidential administration committed to talks could find legal workarounds or issue waivers, just as it did with the Taliban.

The precedent of Afghanistan: The U.S. talks with the Taliban in Doha set a powerful precedent. That process demonstrated that an FTO designation is not an insurmountable barrier when there is a political will for negotiation. Supporters of this approach would argue that if it was possible with the group that harbored Al-Qaeda before 9/11, it is possible with an Al-Qaeda affiliate.

Mutual Motivation: For talks to be possible, both sides need a reason to come to the table.

For the U.S.: The motivation is clear: end a costly and seemingly endless military commitment in a region that is not a top-tier strategic priority.

For Al-Shabaab: While ideologically opposed to the West, the group is also under constant military pressure. A deal that ensures the withdrawal of U.S. drones and foreign African troops would be a strategic windfall, allowing them to consolidate power and pursue their domestic agenda. The chance to achieve their primary goal—the removal of foreign forces—through negotiation is a powerful incentive.

What could an agreement look like?

Any potential agreement would likely mirror the core structure of the U.S.-Taliban deal, focusing on a “terrorism for troops” trade.

U.S. Demands: The non-negotiable item for Washington would be a binding commitment from Al-Shabaab to sever all ties with transnational terrorist networks, specifically Al-Qaeda. The U.S. would demand guarantees that Somali territory will never again be used as a haven to plan or launch attacks against the United States or its allies.

Al-Shabaab demands: The group’s central demand would be the complete withdrawal of all foreign military forces from Somalia, including U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) personnel and the African Union (ATMIS) mission. They would also demand the lifting of international sanctions, the removal of the FTO designation, and likely some form of international recognition or at least non-interference.

The unsettled questions: The most challenging part of any agreement would involve the future of Somalia itself. An agreement would likely be vague on internal Somali politics but could touch upon the following:

Power-sharing: A potential role for Al-Shabaab in governing parts or all of the country. This could range from recognized regional autonomy in their strongholds to a formal role in a national unity government.

Sharia law: Al-Shabaab’s demand for the implementation of its strict interpretation of Islamic law would be a significant point of contention.

Disarmament: The question of what to do with thousands of Al-Shabaab fighters needs to be addressed, although this is often deferred to a later, intra-Somali stage of negotiations.

The critical question: What about the Somali government?

This is the most perilous aspect of the entire scenario. Direct U.S.-Al-Shabaab talks would place the internationally recognized Somali Federal Government (SFG) in a highly vulnerable position.

Sidelined and undermined: As the Afghan government was largely excluded from the initial U.S.-Taliban talks, the SFG would likely be sidelined as well. This would fatally undermine its legitimacy, showing the world—and its people—that its primary security partner is negotiating its future with its mortal enemy.

Loss of leverage: The SFG’s authority is heavily dependent on international military and financial support. If the U.S., its main backer, signals a desire to exit, the government loses its most significant piece of leverage. Its stalled military offensive already reveals its limitations without robust foreign support.

Forced to the Table: Ultimately, the U.S. goal would be to move an intra-Somali dialogue between the government and Al-Shabaab. However, by that point, the power dynamics would have been fundamentally altered. The SFG would be forced to negotiate from a position of profound weakness, with Al-Shabaab emboldened and legitimized by its deal with the United States.

In conclusion, while the prospect of U.S.-Al-Shabaab talks is still speculative, it represents a logical, if jarring, endpoint for a foreign policy doctrine focused on ending “endless wars.” It is possible, following the blueprint from Afghanistan, but it would be fraught with risk.

Such a deal could secure narrow U.S. counterterrorism interests. However, it would do so at the likely cost of the current Somali political order, paving the way for a future where Al-Shabaab holds recognized political power.