Mogadishu (Caasimada Online) – The self-declared Republic of Somaliland is doubling down on a high-stakes bet on its future. By deepening its partnership with Taiwan, which has been developing for a few years, the unrecognized state has deliberately escalated its role in the rivalry between China and the United States, trading caution for a chance at the international legitimacy it has sought for over 30 years.

This long-standing relationship, which saw the two sides establish representative offices in 2020 and cooperate on a range of issues, including healthcare and technology, reached a new milestone with a landmark coast guard agreement in July 2025.

The move, lauded by Taipei as a step toward ensuring a “non-red Somaliland shoreline,” is a calculated act of defiance against Beijing and a risky play for Western patronage that could either secure its sovereignty or invite catastrophic consequences.

But behind the symbolism lies a growing concern: Somaliland may be overplaying a weak hand. By inserting itself into a global superpower rivalry without the backing of formal recognition, economic resilience, or military protection, it risks making a strategic miscalculation that could have dramatic consequences.

An alliance of the unrecognized

The partnership is born of shared diplomatic isolation. Both Somaliland and Taiwan exist as de facto democratic states that lack broad international recognition.

For Somaliland, which unilaterally declared independence from Somalia in 1991 after a brutal civil war, the alliance is a vehicle to gain the attention of Washington. Hargeisa’s leadership believes that by aligning with Taiwan—a key interest for many in the U.S. Congress and national security establishment—it can transform itself from a regional anomaly into a strategic asset.

The relationship already yields tangible benefits, including Taiwanese military training for Somaliland officers, development aid, and the prospect of investment in its untapped oil reserves.

Yet the cost of this realignment may exceed the benefits. Somaliland’s leaders appear to be gambling that symbolic alignment with the West will translate into lasting protection and recognition—without any guarantee that those outcomes will materialize. This belief dangerously underestimates the transactional nature of global diplomacy, especially in Africa.

For Taiwan, the partnership is a crucial diplomatic victory and a strategic foothold in a continent dominated by Chinese influence. With its formal allies dwindling under pressure from Beijing, the relationship with Somaliland serves as a showcase for Taiwan’s “values-based” diplomacy, which aims to build resilient partnerships with like-minded democracies.

More critically, a friendly presence on the Gulf of Aden provides a counterweight to China’s massive military base in neighboring Djibouti, helping to monitor vital Red Sea shipping lanes that Beijing seeks to control.

But while Taiwan gains a strategic outpost, Somaliland risks being reduced to a symbolic chess piece in a much larger game—one where it could be sacrificed once the geopolitical board shifts.

Beijing’s furious response

Predictably, Beijing’s reaction to the deepening ties has been furious. The Chinese Embassy in Somalia condemned the coast guard pact as a “blatant breach” of its sovereignty and warned Somaliland of “self-inflicted consequences”.

This was not mere rhetoric. China immediately reinforced its “One-Somalia” policy, strengthening its alliance with Mogadishu. In a significant escalation, Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Somali counterpart announced a “Strategic Partnership,” explicitly linking the “historical mission of achieving complete national reunification” for both China (with Taiwan) and Somalia (with Somaliland).

By doing so, Beijing has skillfully transformed Somaliland’s bid for recognition into a catalyst for strengthening its primary regional adversary.

Rather than isolating Mogadishu, Somaliland’s gamble has unintentionally strengthened it—giving China a compelling reason to double down on military and diplomatic support for Somalia.

A perilous path forward

The risks for Somaliland are immense and multifaceted. Diplomatically, by crossing Beijing’s “red line” on Taiwan, it has guaranteed a Chinese veto on any future bid for UN membership, effectively closing the door on full de jure recognition.

Economically, Hargeisa has forfeited potential Chinese investment and exposed its fragile economy to the threat of coercion. The case of Lithuania, which faced Chinese secondary sanctions for deepening ties with Taiwan, serves as a stark warning.

However, Somaliland lacks the protection of the European Union that helped Vilnius weather the storm. The recent diplomatic flip of Nauru from Taipei to Beijing, reportedly driven by economic incentives, underscores the power of China’s financial muscle.

Most critically, Somaliland has no fallback plan. Its economy is vulnerable, its recognition efforts have stalled, and its security depends on powers that remain noncommittal. In the event of a coordinated economic or military pushback from Beijing and Mogadishu, Somaliland may find itself dangerously isolated and without sufficient external support.

The most perilous threat, however, is the destabilization of security. There are credible fears that China could significantly increase military aid to Somalia, emboldening Mogadishu to seek a military solution.

This is not hypothetical; in 2023, Beijing was accused of fueling a proxy conflict in Somaliland’s Las Anod region, an act of destabilization that successfully forced the cancellation of a major U.S. military exercise planned at the Port of Berbera.

This incident highlights the precariousness of Somaliland’s reliance on American support. Washington’s policy is dangerously ambivalent, caught between a supportive National Security Council and the Pentagon, which view Somaliland as a strategic counter to China, and a cautious State Department that officially adheres to a “One-Somalia Policy.”

This division results in encouragement without commitment. The U.S. appears to be using Somaliland as a low-cost pawn to probe Chinese influence, but its willingness to retreat when faced with real pushback—as seen with the canceled military drill—leaves Hargeisa dangerously exposed.

By relying on an ambiguous American policy and provoking a predictable Chinese backlash, Somaliland may have placed itself in a worst-case scenario: antagonizing a superpower while trusting an unreliable patron.

African Union reluctance

The African Union, meanwhile, remains paralyzed. The continental body is constrained by its fear of encouraging secessionist movements, a principle that has led it to overlook its own 2005 fact-finding mission, which found Somaliland’s case for restoring its prior independence to be “historically unique and self-justified.” This inaction has created a regional vacuum, allowing geopolitical rivalries to fester.

Somaliland’s growing isolation on the continent may deepen if more African states align with Beijing’s position. By stepping outside AU consensus, it risks alienating potential allies who fear their own internal separatist challenges.

Somaliland has successfully leveraged its relationship with Taiwan to gain a foothold on the world stage. It has traded the long-shot dream of universal recognition for the tangible benefits of a partnership with the democratic world. Yet, in playing with the fire of great power competition, it has antagonized a superpower, strengthened its regional rival, and placed its fate in the hands of an ambivalent patron.

In doing so, it may have sacrificed long-term strategic security for short-term symbolic gains. If recognition does not follow—and the West does not protect it—this bold maneuver may be remembered not as a breakthrough, but as a historic blunder.

Hargeisa has made its high-stakes wager; the world now watches to see if it can control the inferno it has ignited.