Hargeisa, Somalia — Somaliland’s president has urged Qatar to open diplomatic and development offices in Hargeisa, using talks with Doha’s envoy to press for a more permanent Gulf presence in the breakaway territory.
President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Irro” made the request on Wednesday at the presidential palace in Hargeisa during a meeting with Qatar’s ambassador to Somalia, Abdullah Bin Salem Al Nuaimi, according to a statement from the Somaliland presidency.
The two men discussed ways to deepen cooperation in social development, the economy, investment, and humanitarian aid, the statement said, echoing parallel readouts carried by regional media.
Office request
Irro thanked Qatar for its past support to Somaliland, particularly relief during recent droughts, and said his government wanted to see that engagement “taken to the next level”.
He invited Doha to establish development, charitable, and diplomatic offices in Somaliland, signalling that Hargeisa wants a visible, on-the-ground Qatari presence rather than ad hoc engagement through Mogadishu.
Such offices would not amount to formal recognition of Somaliland, which declared independence from Somalia in 1991 but remains unrecognised by any state.
However, they would bring Qatar into the group of partners that already operate representative missions in Hargeisa, even as they maintain official relations with Somalia.
The president also told the ambassador that Somaliland is ready to engage in broad cooperation with Qatar on regional security, infrastructure, water, health, and education.
He framed that agenda as part of a longer-term effort to anchor Somaliland in Gulf economic and political networks along the Red Sea corridor.
Aid and investment
Qatar has become a notable donor to Somaliland during recent dry spells.
In August, Doha pledged $3 million in emergency funding for drought-hit communities, a package local officials said would help families facing acute shortages of food and water.
The presidency said Irro used Wednesday’s talks to welcome that support and to encourage Qatar to expand development and investment projects tailored specifically to Somaliland.
For his part, Al Nuaimi thanked the president for the reception and reiterated Qatar’s commitment to existing humanitarian and development programmes in Somaliland, according to the official readout and matching accounts in local outlets.
Qatar has not publicly commented on the specific call to open a diplomatic office in Hargeisa.
The ambassador remains formally accredited to Somalia’s federal government in Mogadishu, where he has held a series of meetings this year with senior officials to review bilateral ties.
Unrecognised but active
Somaliland runs its own government and security forces. It has cultivated a reputation for relative stability, helped by foreign investment in the strategic port of Berbera on the Gulf of Aden.
Dubai-based DP World operates the facility under a long-term Berbera port concession, which it promotes as a future hub for trade into Ethiopia and the wider region.
Over the past decade, Somaliland has also built especially close ties with the United Arab Emirates.
Abu Dhabi originally planned to establish a military facility at Berbera as part of a broader base and training deal. While the project was later converted into a civilian airport, Emirati money still dominates large parts of Somaliland’s coastline and logistics sector.
Those ties give the UAE significant leverage in Berbera and around Somaliland’s ports.
Diplomats say any attempt by Qatar to move from aid partner to deeper political or commercial presence would have to navigate that Emirati footprint, even though the 2017–2021 Gulf crisis formally ended with the Al-Ula reconciliation.
The territory already hosts representative or liaison offices from several partners, including Ethiopia and a Taiwan representative office in Somaliland, which handle trade, consular, and development work without recognising Somaliland as a state.
Regional sensitivities
However, foreign governments’ dealings with Hargeisa often trigger political sensitivity.
Under international law, states continue to treat Somaliland as part of Somalia, and Mogadishu insists that any embassy or formal mission anywhere on Somali territory must be cleared with the federal government.
Those red lines have been tested repeatedly. In early 2024, Ethiopia signed a controversial sea-access pact with Somaliland that would give Addis Ababa a foothold on the Red Sea in exchange for possible recognition of Somaliland’s independence.
Somalia swiftly rejected the deal, declared it had no legal force, and later passed a law nullifying the agreement.
The uproar echoed earlier rows over Taiwan’s office in Hargeisa and over foreign commercial concessions signed directly with Somaliland.
Each time, Somalia has argued that breakaway authorities have no right to sign external agreements, let alone host foreign missions, without federal consent.
Against that backdrop, Qatar will have to balance any step toward a permanent presence in Hargeisa with its long-standing ties to Somalia’s federal government, which has relied on Qatari funding and political backing in recent years.
A development or liaison office in Somaliland would fall short of recognition. Yet, it would still be read in Mogadishu as a political signal, not just a technical move.
Somaliland–Qatar alignment
At the same time, Somaliland has worked to align itself more clearly with Doha.
In September, its foreign ministry issued a statement condemning attacks on the State of Qatar and calling for regional stability, a language aimed at projecting solidarity and gratitude for assistance.
Wednesday’s readout stayed on that diplomatic tone.
It highlighted “mutual respect” and “shared interests,” and framed the proposed Qatari offices as tools for development, charity, and humanitarian work rather than overt political representation.
Officials stressed that cooperation on regional security, economic infrastructure, and basic services would benefit both sides.
There was no immediate public reaction from Somalia’s federal government to the Hargeisa meeting or to Irro’s call for a Qatari diplomatic presence in Somaliland.
For now, diplomats and analysts are watching for practical signals — more Qatari technical visits, new project announcements, or a liaison office in Hargeisa — to gauge how far Doha is willing to go without formally changing its stance on Somaliland’s status.