Mogadishu (Caasimada Online) – In mid-2022, Somalia was on the cusp of a historic breakthrough. A popular, clan-led uprising against al-Shabaab in the country’s heartlands, combined with a newly declared “total war” by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s administration, had the al-Qaeda-linked insurgency on the ropes.

For the first time in over a decade, significant territory was being liberated by a Somali-led coalition, sparking cautious optimism that the tide was finally turning in the long and brutal conflict.

Today, that optimism has been replaced by a grim and perilous reality. Al-Shabaab is not only resurgent but is actively threatening the capital, Mogadishu, after a devastating 2025 counter-offensive that has erased nearly all the government’s hard-won gains. The group has recaptured a string of strategic towns, including the critical forward operating base of Mahaas on July 27, 2025, and even attempted to assassinate the president himself within the capital.

This dramatic reversal was not merely a result of the militants’ resilience. It was the direct consequence of a catastrophic strategic miscalculation by the Somali government. By prioritizing a divisive and high-stakes political project to overhaul the constitution and centralize power, the administration fractured the national anti-insurgent coalition, alienated its most critical allies, and created a political and security vacuum that al-Shabaab skillfully exploited.

The government chose to fight a war on two fronts—one against the insurgency and another against its fragile political system—and is now on the verge of losing both.

The initial success of the 2022–2023 offensive was rooted in its organic nature. It began not as a top-down government strategy, but as a grassroots rebellion by clan militias known as the Ma’awisley. For years, communities in central Somalia had endured al-Shabaab’s oppressive rule, but the group’s escalating demands for taxes and child soldiers, coupled with the assassination of respected elders, created a tipping point.

President Mohamud’s newly elected government astutely harnessed this widespread anger, providing the Somali National Army (SNA) as a “hammer” to support Ma’awisley’s “anvil” of local legitimacy and intelligence. This hybrid force, backed by international drone support, dislodged al-Shabaab from significant swathes of Hirshabelle and Galmudug states, including the former insurgent hub of Adan Yabaal.

The gains were the most comprehensive since the mid-2010s, demonstrating that a Somali-led, locally grounded strategy could succeed where years of foreign-led containment had stalled.

The fateful pivot to politics

Just as the military offensive was reaching its peak, the government’s focus shifted from the battlefield to the legislative chamber. In late 2023, the administration initiated an ambitious effort to amend Somalia’s 2012 provisional constitution, a document that had intentionally left unresolved contentious issues of power-sharing.

The proposed reforms, controversially passed by parliament in March 2024, were sweeping. They sought to replace the clan-based power-sharing model with a presidential system, introduce universal suffrage, and grant the president the authority to appoint and dismiss the prime minister—a power previously held by parliament.

While the government framed the agenda as a necessary step toward a modern and stable state, critics and political rivals immediately denounced it as a unilateral power grab. Powerful regional leaders and former presidents accused Mohamud of using the reforms to consolidate his authority and rig the political landscape ahead of the 2026 elections.

The process, pushed through without a broad consensus, was seen as an existential threat by federal member states like Puntland and Jubaland, which fiercely guard their autonomy.

What was especially damaging was the failure to use this constitutional moment as a nation-building opportunity. Instead of pursuing inclusive dialogue with regional stakeholders, the government’s top-down approach deepened distrust and hardened opposition to its policies.

A more consultative process—especially one that took into account the concerns of Puntland and Jubaland—could have strengthened the legitimacy of the state rather than eroding it.

The coalition crumbles

The political fallout was immediate and devastating to the war effort. In March 2024, following the passage of the amendments, the powerful state of Puntland announced it would no longer recognize the authority of the federal government, effectively withdrawing one of the nation’s most capable regional security forces from any coordinated anti-insurgency effort.

The relationship with Jubaland state followed a similar trajectory, culminating in armed clashes between federal and Jubaland forces in late 2024 after Mogadishu rejected the legitimacy of its regional election.

As the federal government became consumed by these political battles, the frontline forces felt abandoned. Support for the Ma’awisley clan militias—the backbone of the offensive—reportedly dried up.

Feeling betrayed, their morale plummeted, and many units simply withdrew from the fight, leaving the overstretched and logistically challenged SNA exposed. The much-anticipated second phase of the offensive, “Operation Black Lion,” was indefinitely postponed as the “total war” ground to a halt.

Compounding this collapse was a deeper issue: the Somali state’s limited capacity to govern newly liberated areas. Corruption, poor coordination, and inconsistent international funding hampered the government’s ability to provide basic services or economic incentives.

In many rural communities, disillusionment grew as the promise of liberation gave way to neglect—creating a void that al-Shabaab was quick to fill with its own brutal but predictable form of governance.

Al-Shabaab’s deadly renaissance

The political vacuum was a gift to al-Shabaab. The group, which thrives on government disunity, regrouped and launched a major counter-offensive in February 2025. Facing demoralized and unsupported government troops, its fighters swiftly recaptured a string of strategic towns.

Adan Yabaal, whose liberation in 2022 was a major symbolic victory, fell back into insurgent hands in April 2025. In July, the group overran Moqokori, Tardo, and the critical government forward operating base of Mahaas, establishing a “triangular stronghold” in central Somalia that allows it to sever government supply lines. Its forces have seized towns less than 50 kilometers from Mogadishu, tightening a virtual noose around the capital.

Critically, al-Shabaab’s comeback was not confined to military might—it was also an intelligence victory. The Somali government’s inability to hold rural areas or maintain local intelligence networks allowed the group to regroup undetected. The failure to consolidate control over these regions after initial liberation highlights a dangerous misconception: that retaking towns alone equates to strategic success.

Meanwhile, public sentiment began to shift. Communities that once celebrated the downfall of al-Shabaab grew frustrated with the federal government’s lack of follow-through. As the conflict dragged on and promises of stability failed to materialize, many civilians chose neutrality—or quiet cooperation with insurgents—as a means of survival. The loss of civilian trust further undermined the government’s legitimacy and its war effort.

The government’s decision to prioritize political consolidation over national security has not only stalled a promising offensive but also actively enabled the enemy’s resurgence.

Conclusion 

The opportunity of 2022 was not simply missed—it was squandered. Today, the Somali state is more fragmented, its security forces more divided, and al-Shabaab more confident and strategically positioned than it has been in years, leaving the country on a perilous path with no easy options ahead.

Somalia’s war against al-Shabaab has now fallen into a dangerous historical pattern. Similar offensives in 2011–2014 also made sweeping gains, only to collapse when political infighting, poor coordination, and lack of follow-up sapped momentum. The cycle of advance and retreat continues—not because of battlefield failures, but because political leaders have repeatedly failed to translate military victories into sustainable governance.

What’s worse, the country’s internal fragmentation is increasingly intertwined with regional rivalries. Neighboring states and Gulf powers have pursued their own interests through Somali factions, sometimes deepening divisions between federal member states and Mogadishu. As external actors align with various Somali stakeholders, the civil conflict risks becoming regionalized, complicating efforts to develop a cohesive national strategy.