BEIJING, Somalia – In a nation long torn by civil war and extremist violence, Somalia is now emerging as a focal point for China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI), with Beijing stepping up military and law enforcement cooperation with Mogadishu.
This growing partnership was underscored earlier this month when more than two dozen officers from the Somali National Armed Forces received training scholarships in China.
At the ceremony, China’s ambassador to Somalia, Wang Yu, pledged that “China will not be absent” in efforts to help the East African nation achieve peace.
For Somalia—still grappling with the fallout of the 1991 overthrow of President Siad Barre—such support is vital as it works to build a self-reliant defense force against the extremist group al-Shabab, especially with the African Union mission preparing for a phased withdrawal.
The scholarship initiative is the latest step in a series of security engagements under the GSI framework. Just last month, another group of Somali security officials completed training in China on law enforcement, internal security, and border control.
In July, the Chinese embassy also held talks with the Somali Police Force Coast Guard on anti-piracy cooperation—an issue closely tied to China’s fishing interests and its naval patrols in the Gulf of Aden.
Launched by President Xi Jinping in 2022, the GSI is presented as an alternative to Western-led alliances, founded on the principles of mutual respect and non-interference. Africa has become a key testing ground for this vision, and Somalia is serving as a clear example of how Beijing is turning lofty principles into tangible action.
Ilaria Carrozza, a senior researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo, said China’s training programs in Somalia show how the GSI is evolving from “broad rhetorical principles… to concrete security diplomacy.”
She pointed out that this fits into a broader pattern of China using security assistance to “strengthen long-term bilateral ties and safeguard its economic interests in Africa,” while expanding its own influence rather than replacing Western actors outright.
Analysts argue that these targeted programs give substance to the otherwise abstract GSI. Paul Nantulya, a China-Africa specialist at the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, noted that by branding training under the GSI, “China can breathe life into it and give it substance over form.”
He added that the emphasis on domestic security in Somalia aligns neatly with one of the GSI’s core tenets.
Somalia’s role aligns with a broader pledge made by President Xi, who has promised to train 6,000 military personnel and 1,000 law enforcement officers from Africa by 2027, supported by a commitment of 1 billion yuan ($140 million) in military aid.
While Somalia is a major recipient, other countries such as Ethiopia and Nigeria have also signed training agreements with China.
Still, China’s model has its critics. Nantulya’s research shows that while some African governments welcome the GSI as an extra source of security assistance, others are cautious about the risks.
One key concern is that by emphasizing regime security, the Chinese approach could strengthen political militaries—serving the interests of ruling parties rather than fostering apolitical, professional armed forces.