DJIBOUTI (Caasimada Online) – In the strategic crucible of the Horn of Africa, where global trade routes converge, an intense geopolitical standoff between Djibouti and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has broken into the open.

Centered on the vital Doraleh port, the conflict has escalated far beyond a commercial dispute, evolving into what Djibouti’s leadership views as a fundamental struggle for its sovereignty and economic independence.

In a remarkably candid interview, Djiboutian President Ismail Omar Guelleh has accused the UAE of practicing a form of “disguised colonialism” by using financial leverage to control his nation’s destiny—a charge that illuminates a wider race for dominance over the critical trade arteries of the Red Sea.

Guelleh’s direct accusations

Speaking with The Africa Report, President Guelleh asserted that the UAE has maintained a “hostile attitude” ever since Djibouti refused to “bow to their terms” regarding the management of the Doraleh port by the Emirati-owned conglomerate DP World. “And we will not yield,” Guelleh stated, framing the dispute as a matter of national principle.

The President accuses Abu Dhabi of systematically using its financial might to interfere in Djibouti’s internal affairs, aiming to seize control of its core infrastructure. He described the original port management contracts with DP World, which his government unilaterally terminated in 2018, as “colonialism wrapped in commercial packaging.”

Guelleh warned that the UAE’s ambitions extend beyond his country’s borders, noting that Djibouti “is not the only country to view the UAE’s policies as a threat to regional stability.” He also revealed that a primary motive for dissolving Djibouti’s sovereign wealth fund was to prevent it from being exploited as a gateway for DP World to acquire additional strategic assets.

On the prospect of de-escalation, Guelleh expressed deep skepticism, seeing no genuine intent for mediation from the UAE. His critique also encompassed the UAE’s military and political activities across the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in Yemen, which Djibouti perceives as a direct threat to its strategic interests.

The genesis of the conflict

The current tension is a new phase in a rivalry that ignited on February 23, 2018, when Djibouti canceled DP World’s 50-year concession to operate the Doraleh container terminal. Djibouti defended the decision as a necessary defense of its economic sovereignty against what it deemed “unfair and unbalanced terms.”

DP World challenged the termination through international arbitration, securing multiple rulings from the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) that upheld the contract’s legality. However, Djibouti has steadfastly refused to honor these rulings, arguing that the opaque agreement granted a foreign power excessive control over a national asset vital to its security and economic future.

The dispute rapidly acquired a broader geopolitical dimension. In a July 2018 diplomatic memorandum, then-Foreign Minister Mahamoud Ali Youssouf accused the UAE of acting as the “armed and financial wing” of the Trump administration’s regional agenda.

Youssouf claimed the UAE was leveraging its influence to re-engineer alliances in the Horn of Africa, explicitly citing the UAE-brokered rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea. This deal, backed by billions in Emirati investment pledges to Ethiopia, was seen in Djibouti as a direct maneuver to undermine its primary role as the maritime gateway for Africa’s second-most populous nation.

A shifting geopolitical chessboard

Djibouti fears the UAE’s actions are part of a deliberate strategy to isolate it and diminish its regional importance. The potential diversion of Ethiopian trade to Eritrean ports, facilitated by Emirati capital, represents a significant economic threat. These moves are interpreted in Djibouti not as simple business competition but as a coordinated political and financial pressure campaign.

The Horn of Africa’s strategic geography has made it a theater of intense competition among global and regional powers.

From Djibouti’s vantage point, the UAE’s role is uniquely destabilizing, as it actively backs Ethiopia’s quest for alternative sea access. This support is viewed as an existential threat and is the principal driver of President Guelleh’s sharp condemnations.

Securing reliable port access is a paramount national interest for landlocked Ethiopia. The UAE has skillfully positioned itself as a key financial and political broker in this endeavor, facilitating agreements for Ethiopia to use ports in Eritrea and the self-declared republic of Somaliland. This has profoundly alarmed Djibouti, which risks losing its long-held status as Ethiopia’s economic lifeline.

Counter-moves and new alliances

In response to this mounting pressure, Djibouti has launched a strategic pivot. Economically, it is working to reduce its dependence on Ethiopia by investing heavily in its port infrastructure.

By upgrading its facilities to handle the world’s largest container ships, Djibouti aims to rebrand itself as a regional transshipment hub, serving smaller ports and diversifying its revenue streams.

Politically, a new map of regional alliances is taking shape. The UAE-backed memorandum of understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland to develop a port at Berbera has catalyzed a strategic realignment.

As an Ethiopia-Somaliland-UAE axis solidifies, Djibouti is working to build a counterbalance. This includes strengthening ties with the Federal Government of Somalia—Somaliland’s adversary—and deepening its relationship with Saudi Arabia, a regional rival of the UAE.

Observers suggest that other powers, such as Egypt, which has a long-standing dispute with Ethiopia over Nile waters, may see these new alignments as an opportunity to recalibrate the regional balance of power.

For Djibouti’s leaders, the battle over the Doraleh port has transcended its origins. It is now a defining struggle for the nation’s strategic relevance in a volatile geopolitical landscape—one in which the UAE’s influence is seen as the central threat, whether by fostering economic alternatives for Ethiopia or by attempting to encircle Djibouti with new alliances that would marginalize its crucial role in the Red Sea corridor.