MOGADISHU, Somalia – An investigation by Israel Hayom has uncovered extensive details about a sophisticated Iranian weapons smuggling network supplying Yemen’s Houthi rebels, with Somalia’s coastline playing a pivotal role in the operation.
The revelations are based on testimonies from crew members of the al-Sharwa vessel, intercepted in recent days while attempting to deliver strategic weapons to Yemen during what they admitted was their 12th smuggling mission.
According to the crew, the network is operated jointly by Hezbollah operatives and Iran’s Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guard, using a combination of direct, indirect, and covert maritime corridors to bypass international sanctions.
Somalia’s territorial waters form one of the most important of these routes, with Iranian forces reportedly maintaining forward operating positions along the coast to coordinate transfers to Houthi-controlled ports in Yemen.
The testimonies describe how advanced weapons — including ballistic missile components, drone technology, and anti-aircraft systems — were systematically disguised as legitimate industrial cargo.
Items such as generators, transformers, and manufacturing pumps were loaded with accompanying paperwork indicating Djibouti as their final destination. In reality, the cargo was staged for onward transfer to Yemen once it reached the Horn of Africa.
South Yemen security forces discovered the elaborate deception when they dismantled the supposed “factory equipment” and uncovered sophisticated radar systems, missile guidance devices, and strategic weapons technology designed to enhance Houthi capabilities against international shipping in the Red Sea.
Captured crew members identified three main smuggling corridors:
- Primary route: Direct shipments from Iran’s strategic Bandar Abbas port to Yemen’s al-Salif port in the northwest.
- Secondary route via Somalia: Coastal transfer points operated by Iranian Revolutionary Guards, enabling smaller vessels to move weapons into Yemeni waters under the cover of fishing or trade activity.
- Tertiary route via Djibouti: Commercial shipping channels using local operatives to conceal weapons within legitimate cargo before final transfer to Yemen.
The Somalia corridor, in particular, was described as essential in keeping supply lines open when military strikes disrupted other routes. Several crew members admitted to transporting “sensitive chemicals” from Somalia, disguised as cancer treatment drugs, which were later used by Iranian forces in the production of ballistic missile fuel.
Others recounted participating in oil and weapons shipments from Somali waters directly to Yemen’s al-Salif port, bypassing international monitoring efforts.
The smuggling network is reportedly overseen by high-ranking Houthi officials working in close coordination with Iranian military advisors:
- Abu Jaafar al-Talbi, deputy defense minister for the Houthi regime, is responsible for all military logistics and directly liaising with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.
- Hussein al-Attas, head of the “general authority for fishing in the Red Sea,” uses his maritime authority to recruit sailors for Iranian missions and direct operations originating from Somalia and Djibouti.
- Eyad Atini, deputy to al-Attas, managing port operations at al-Salif and al-Hudaydah.
- Yahya Jiniya is tasked with recruitment and coordination of smuggling crews.
- Ibrahim al-Moayad is handling financial operations and payment distribution.
- Mostafa al-Sharfi, key liaison with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, provides Persian translation services, coordinating Yemeni sailors’ travel to Iran, and managing container shipping logistics.
Testimonies detailed how smugglers moved between Yemen, Somalia, and Iran under civilian commercial cover, sometimes traveling via complex multi-country routes: flying from Sanaa to Jordan, onward to Lebanon, crossing into Syria, then flying to Tehran before reaching Bandar Abbas. There, the Revolutionary Guards provided weapons training and operational briefings before assigning crews to missions along the Somalia, Djibouti, and direct Iranian corridors.
An alternative, shorter pathway involved crossing into Oman, which often mediates between the Houthis and Western governments. From Omani territory, smugglers could fly directly to Iran — a route that crew members say was deliberately used to exploit regional diplomatic sensitivities.
Vessels operating along the Somali corridor reportedly traveled primarily at night, staying close to shore to evade detection by international naval patrols monitoring Red Sea shipping lanes for sanctions violations.
The crew noted that the Somali coastline offered numerous small harbors and inlets suitable for clandestine transfers, many of them outside the reach of effective maritime policing.
Senior South Yemen officer Rakkan Ali Talyan told al-Jumhuriya channel that the testimonies confirm the Houthis’ deep coordination with Hezbollah and Iranian operatives in both Syria and Oman, as well as at maritime staging points along Somalia’s coast.
Yemeni intelligence sources added that Somalia’s role is now so embedded in the network that it functions as a permanent fallback route whenever direct Iranian shipments are disrupted by military action.
The Israel Hayom investigation concludes that Somalia is not merely a stopover, but a critical operational hub in a transcontinental smuggling enterprise spanning the Middle East, Africa, and Asia — a network designed to sustain the Houthis’ military capabilities in the Red Sea and beyond, despite intensified U.S. and Israeli strikes on their supply lines.