Mogadishu (Caasimada Online) – The strategic Somali border town of Doolow once again became a flashpoint in the Horn of Africa’s most complex and fraught relationship. In a scene grimly reminiscent of past confrontations, Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) troops clashed directly with personnel from Somalia’s federal intelligence agency.

The firefight, which reportedly left at least one federal soldier dead and saw the local intelligence commander arrested, was not a random skirmish. It was a calculated display of power, deeply enmeshed in a bitter internal Somali political struggle and timed with cynical precision as Somalia’s president was in Addis Ababa for diplomatic talks.

The incident is the latest in a pattern of violations that has seen Mogadishu issue furious condemnations, accusing Ethiopia of “blatant aggression” and a flagrant disregard for its sovereignty. Yet, despite the outrage, Somalia has consistently stopped short of severing all ties. This paradox raises a critical question: Why does a nation, whose sovereignty is so openly challenged, continue to engage with its aggressor?

The answer lies in a painful reality forged by a crippling security dependency, deep internal political fractures that Ethiopia masterfully exploits, and a pragmatic, if agonizing, strategy for national survival. Somalia is not passively watching these violations; it is navigating a crisis it cannot afford to escalate.

But the time for strategic patience may be reaching its limit. Continued passivity risks normalizing Ethiopian violations, eroding the very concept of Somali sovereignty. If these incidents go unanswered, they will set a dangerous precedent—that Somalia’s borders and military personnel can be violated with impunity.

A nation hostage to its security

The primary reason Somalia cannot afford a complete diplomatic rupture, as some argue, is its profound and inescapable dependence on the very military it accuses of aggression. For over a decade, Ethiopia has been a cornerstone of the fight against Al-Shabaab, the al-Qaeda-affiliated insurgency that continues to control vast swathes of rural Somalia and poses an existential threat to the state.

Ethiopia maintains a formidable and complex military footprint inside Somalia, operating on two parallel tracks. First, approximately 2,500 ENDF soldiers are officially part of the African Union-led peacekeeping mission, now known as AUSSOM, playing a formal role in joint operations with the Somali National Army (SNA).

Second, and more significantly, an estimated 5,000 to 7,000 additional Ethiopian troops are stationed in Somalia under separate bilateral agreements. These non-AU forces operate with greater autonomy, primarily in the border regions of Gedo, Bakool, and Hirshabelle, creating a deep security buffer to protect Ethiopia from cross-border attacks.

This combined force of over 10,000 seasoned soldiers is indispensable. Somali regional officials, particularly in the Southwest and Jubaland states, have openly stated that a sudden withdrawal of Ethiopian forces would be catastrophic, creating a security vacuum that would only benefit Al-Shabaab. The Somali National Army, still in a developmental phase, is wholly unprepared to fill such a void.  

Ethiopia’s proxy politics in Gedo

Beyond its indispensable military role, Ethiopia wields another powerful instrument of influence: its ability to manipulate the deep political fault lines that run through the Somali state. The constant power struggle between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in Mogadishu and semi-autonomous Federal Member States (FMS) provides Addis Ababa with multiple levers to apply pressure and protect its interests.

Nowhere is this more evident than in the Gedo region, the epicenter of Monday’s clash. Nominally part of Jubaland state, Gedo has long been a tinderbox of political and clan-based conflict.

The FGS has persistently worked to undermine the authority of Jubaland’s president, Ahmed Madobe, whom it views as an obstacle to its centralizing ambitions. In response, Ethiopia has cultivated a strong, long-standing alliance with Madobe and the Jubaland administration, providing them with military and political backing in their struggles against both Al-Shabaab and the FGS.

The clashes in Doolow are a direct result of this dynamic. In both the recent incident and a similar one in December 2024, Ethiopian forces intervened decisively on behalf of their Jubaland allies against federal troops. This serves as a powerful message to Mogadishu that its authority is severely limited in regions where Ethiopia has deep-rooted interests.

Critics argue that the FGS’s relentless campaign against Jubaland has created the very instability that invites this foreign meddling, at times diverting crucial resources from the fight against Al-Shabaab and creating security vacuums for the militants to exploit.

But proxy interference in internal political disputes crosses a dangerous line. Ethiopia is no longer a neutral partner—it is acting as a regional power broker using Somalia’s internal divisions to preserve its strategic leverage.

Mogadishu cannot afford to let this dynamic continue unchecked. A sustained diplomatic counter-campaign—both regionally and internationally—is urgently needed to reframe Ethiopia not as a peacekeeping ally, but as a destabilizing force violating Somali sovereignty.

The diplomatic tightrope walk

Faced with these constraints, Somalia has adopted a nuanced diplomatic strategy that combines protest and pragmatism. The current cycle of tension was ignited in January 2024, when Ethiopia signed a controversial Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the breakaway region of Somaliland, offering potential diplomatic recognition in exchange for a 50-year lease on a naval base.

The deal sparked fury in Mogadishu, which expelled Ethiopia’s ambassador and threatened to bar its troops from the new AU mission. This high-stakes gambit successfully internationalized the dispute, creating a regional crisis that drew in international partners.

The diplomatic off-ramp came in December 2024 with the Turkish-brokered Ankara Declaration. The agreement was a masterclass in face-saving diplomacy: Ethiopia reaffirmed its respect for Somalia’s sovereignty, while Somalia acknowledged Ethiopia’s need for sea access and the sacrifices of its troops in the fight against Al-Shabaab. This allowed Mogadishu to claim a victory on principle while gracefully backing down from its threat to expel the indispensable Ethiopian forces.

However, as the recurring clashes in Doolow demonstrate, such diplomatic agreements do not erase the complex power realities on the ground. These incidents serve as Ethiopia’s periodic and brutal reminders to Mogadishu that its leverage remains intact, regardless of the text of any declaration.

The Ankara Declaration gave Ethiopia a reputational reset it did not earn. Its repeated violations since then show that Addis Ababa cannot be trusted to respect Somalia’s sovereignty without consequence. Future diplomacy must be backed by credible deterrents—whether legal, regional, or military in nature. Otherwise, Ethiopia will continue to treat Somali territory as negotiable space.

The case for a firm response

Somalia is at a pivotal inflection point. Continued accommodation of Ethiopia’s increasingly aggressive behavior risks turning what were once exceptional violations into the foundation of a dangerous new normal. Suppose Mogadishu continues to absorb these provocations without consequence. In that case, it risks sending the message that Somali sovereignty is optional. This perception will be difficult, if not impossible, to reverse.

A clear and strategic response is no longer optional—it is a matter of national survival and constitutional dignity. The stakes extend far beyond Doolow or Jubaland; they reach into the very heart of Somalia’s ability to govern itself, defend its borders, and maintain the legitimacy of its institutions.

Mogadishu must now begin building the legal, diplomatic, and regional infrastructure necessary to hold Ethiopia accountable. That includes formally pressing the African Union and IGAD to investigate the ENDF’s violations in Doolow, securing international backing for a phased drawdown of non-AU Ethiopian troops operating under bilateral arrangements, and initiating a broader review of Ethiopia’s military footprint inside Somalia.

Just as crucial is the need to resolve internal divisions. As long as Somalia’s federal institutions remain fragmented, Ethiopia will continue to exploit those cracks to advance its interests at Somalia’s expense. A more unified federal framework will deny Ethiopia its current leverage and strengthen Somalia’s negotiating position on the regional stage.

In parallel, Somalia must actively pursue deeper strategic partnerships with reliable regional actors—such as Turkey, Qatar, and other friendly states—who respect Somalia’s sovereignty and can offer security cooperation without the strings Ethiopia now pulls.

Somalia’s sovereignty cannot, and must not, be contingent on Ethiopia’s approval. The longer Mogadishu delays action, the more entrenched Ethiopia’s influence becomes—both in Gedo and across Somalia’s political landscape. The time to confront this challenge is now—calmly, strategically, but unequivocally.