London, UK — Britain faces new accusations of a “double game” in the Horn of Africa as critics question whether its diplomatic stance on the war in Sudan aligns with its commercial interests in breakaway Somaliland.
At the heart of the controversy is a perceived disconnect between the UK’s role as a champion of accountability in Sudan and its financial exposure in a strategic port project in a region whose independence it does not officially recognise.
Since the war between the Sudanese army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) erupted in April 2023, London has positioned itself as a leading voice for civilian protection. This stance has informed its subsequent diplomatic and policy moves.
In April 2025, the UK co-chaired a major donor meeting with the African Union and European powers to demand humanitarian access. By December, it had imposed sanctions on senior RSF commanders following alleged atrocities in Darfur.
However, analysts argue that Britain’s rhetoric has not been matched by sufficient pressure on regional actors accused of fueling the conflict—specifically, the United Arab Emirates.
While Abu Dhabi acts as a key partner for the UK in other arenas, it faces persistent allegations of arming the RSF.
Sudan has taken the dispute to the International Court of Justice, accusing the UAE of violating the Genocide Convention.
Although Abu Dhabi rejects the claims as baseless, rights groups and Amnesty International have reported identifying advanced weaponry linked to the UAE in the conflict zone.
Port politics
The scrutiny extends to Somalia, where Britain formally supports the federal government’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
In a statement on December 29, the UK Foreign Office reiterated that any change in Somaliland’s status must come through dialogue between Mogadishu and Hargeisa.
Yet, Britain maintains a direct financial footprint in the breakaway region through British International Investment (BII).
The UK’s development finance institution is a minority investor in the Berbera port, operating alongside the Dubai-based logistics giant DP World and Somaliland authorities.
For Somalia’s government, this stake undermines its authority, a sentiment that intensified on January 12 when Mogadishu announced the annulment of defense and port agreements with the UAE, accusing the Gulf state of violating its sovereignty.
The debate comes amid heightened regional tension following Israel’s recent recognition of Somaliland—a move London declined to follow.
Critics argue the result is a credibility problem: Britain condemns abuses in Sudan while remaining financially tied, through a state-backed institution, to a strategic asset operated by a close UAE partner in Somaliland.
While UK officials insist the two tracks are distinct and point to their sanctions record in Sudan, skeptics describe the policy as one of calculated ambiguity.
By avoiding direct confrontation with powerful regional players, analysts say London appears primarily concerned with preserving commercial leverage across the strategic Red Sea corridor.

