Introduction
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of Somalia made a statement that echoed far beyond the Blue Nile banks of Addis Ababa on September 9, 2025, when he attended the opening of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in Ethiopia. As a symbol of energy independence and continental aspirations, the event marked the completion of a ten-year national project for Ethiopia. Simultaneously, the incident intensified Egypt’s fundamental worries over water sovereignty and security. The presence of Mohamud highlighted the fine line that Somalia must walk, balancing its independence from Cairo and Addis Ababa in vital ties but still claiming its sovereignty over foreign affairs.
In order to put Mohamud’s presence at the GERD inauguration into perspective, this essay takes a critical look at Somalia’s geopolitical location between Egypt and Ethiopia. It delves into the event’s symbolic meaning, Somalia’s diplomatic goals, the dangers of being embroiled in Nile politics, and the geopolitical destiny of the Horn of Africa going forward.
Ethiopia’s Dam: Infrastructure as Diplomacy
Ethiopia’s industrial aspirations and regional energy commerce will be revolutionised by the GERD, Africa’s biggest hydropower project, which is anticipated to produce more than 5,000 megawatts of electricity. With his words, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed framed the project as a “source of dignity”, emphasising its developmental and patriotic aspects.
But the GERD is more than just an infrastructural project; it is also a diplomatic platform. In order to demonstrate continental solidarity, Addis Ababa sent invitations to prominent figures from throughout Africa. As a result of the current tensions stemming from Ethiopia’s maritime agreement with Somaliland and its ties to Somali federal entities, Somalia’s participation was mostly symbolic.
Mohamud skilfully managed Somalia’s exposure to Nile Basin tensions by appearing beside Abiy at the dam’s opening, signalling a readiness to renew collaboration, at least symbolically.
Egypt’s Stakes: Nile Security and Horn Projection
Nile water provides about 90% of Egypt’s freshwater, making it an essential resource for the country. Cairo has long sought a legally enforceable agreement for the management of dams, and the GERD poses a risk to downstream flows, particularly during drought periods.
The presence of Somalia at the inauguration caused concern in Cairo. However, Egyptian authorities refrained from openly rupturing the relationship, seeing Mogadishu as an important ally in the Horn of Africa. As part of its strategy to oppose Ethiopia, Egypt is planning to increase its influence on the doorstep of Addis Ababa via a combination of heavy weapon delivery, collaborative training programmes, and an imminent soldier deployment to Somalia.
Egypt is bolstering its Red Sea strategy by deepening its political and military connections with Somalia. This helps the country project influence in the Horn of Africa and ensures the safety of commerce routes via the Suez Canal.
Somalia’s Calculated Gamble
Somalia’s decision to participate in the GERD ceremony was deliberate. The attendance of Mohamud was reportedly pushed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a show of goodwill towards Addis Ababa and a continuation of the Ankara Declaration, a Turkish-brokered accord that aimed to reduce tensions after Ethiopia’s port contract with Somaliland in 2024.
Sudan also has Egypt as a reliable ally in times of need. Planned soldier deployments and Egyptian help to the African Union Help and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) strengthen Mogadishu’s ability to battle al-Shabaab. By associating with Somalia’s political and cultural identity, Cairo carries symbolic weight as an Arab League member.
The calculations in Somalia are so twofold:
To prevent diplomatic exclusion and economic reprisal, reassure Ethiopia of its intention to cooperate.
Help Somalia’s shaky attempts at stabilisation by keeping Egypt’s security alliance strong.
Aspiring to be more than just a pawn in regional conflicts, Somalia is pursuing a non-aligned role in the Horn of Africa via its dual-track diplomacy.
The Risk of Proxy Politics
Despite Mogadishu’s attempts to find a balance, there are many risks. The competition between Egypt and Ethiopia is influencing how both countries see Somalia. While Cairo portrays its involvement as sympathy with an Arab state, Ethiopian authorities have accused Somalia of working with “unannounced players” to disrupt regional security.
Clearly, the stalemate between Egypt and Ethiopia might escalate into a proxy battleground in Somalia. While the presence of Egyptian forces in Somalia might discourage Ethiopia, it could also lead to retaliatory alliances, which could worsen the situation. Adding to the fragmentation of Somalia’s sovereignty, Addis may react by strengthening Somali federal governments or strengthening relations with Somaliland.
Under this situation, Mogadishu runs the danger of being unable to manage its own security situation, making domestic stability dependent on rivalry from outside.
Regional Alliances and Realignments
The GERD ceremony and Egypt’s involvement with Somalia indicate a change in alignments in the Horn of Africa:
Support from the Arab League, military assistance, and security cooperation make up the Somalia-Egypt axis.
Partnership between Ethiopia and Somaliland: Maritime access treaties provide strategic depth to Ethiopia while challenging Somalia’s sovereignty.
Kenya’s Function: Nairobi, which is trying to strike a balance in its ties with Somalia, is promoting itself as a regional energy powerhouse by sending a “principal guest” to the GERD launch.
Potentially swaying the contest are the two neighbouring governments of Djibouti and Eritrea, with Djibouti’s ports and Eritrea’s security alliance with Egypt providing them with an advantage.
Mogadishu must continually renegotiate its position to prevent marginalisation or encirclement as allies move, and this dynamic diplomatic map shows Somalia’s fragility.
Domestic Pressures: Sovereignty and Public Opinion
Somalia’s foreign policy is influenced by both internal and external factors. Whether it is the Somaliland agreement or the presence of foreign troops, public opinion is very sensitive to perceived violations of sovereignty. Therefore, Mohamud’s administration should portray its delicate balancing act as a fight for independence and sovereignty, rather than giving in to outside pressures.
According to Somali authorities, Mohamud’s presence at the GERD inauguration demonstrated Somalia’s entitlement to autonomous diplomacy unfettered by external interference. However, naysayers wonder whether such symbolic actions may drive a wedge between Cairo and Addis, strengthening their positions and jeopardising long-term security.
Geopolitical Futures for Somalia
The future of Somalia in the rivalry between Egypt and Ethiopia will rest on a number of things, including:
The deployment of Egyptian troops might be beneficial to Somalia if their integration with the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) goes well and if they make a positive contribution to counterterrorism efforts. Somalia might turn into a battleground if deployment incites concerns in Ethiopia.
The Ethiopian government’s stance towards Somaliland might bring Mogadishu closer to Cairo if Addis Ababa recognises Somaliland or strengthens commercial connections with the country.
Somalia may be bound into regional grids as a result of Ethiopia’s power exports, which have the ability to transform Horn economies. However, this necessitates a level of political confidence that is now lacking.
To keep Somalia out of the Nile geopolitics, multilateral mediation—including the Ankara Declaration by Turkey, mediation by the African Union, and diplomacy by the Arab League—will be essential.
Critical Gaps and Weaknesses
Despite Somalia’s best efforts, its approach for maintaining balance is severely flawed:
Somalia is structurally reliant on its foreign partners since it does not have the economic or military power to influence results on its own.
Mogadishu is susceptible to outside influence because of its fractured internal politics, which include conflicts among federal member states and weak institutions.
Attendance at prominent events, like the GERD inauguration, creates symbolic capital but may not result in actual policy benefits.
The situation in Somalia might quickly escalate into a war that it did not initiate, what with Egyptian forces moving in and Ethiopian suspicions growing.
Conclusion
President Mohamud’s appearance at the GERD opening was a perfect example of Somalia’s tricky international balancing act. Mogadishu, perched on the edge of the Nile valley and between Cairo and Addis Ababa, is trying to establish its sovereignty, forge important alliances, and stay out of regional disputes. Proxy politics, internal weaknesses, and changing alliances all pose risks to this delicate equilibrium.
Instead of picking a side, Somalia should focus on strengthening international frameworks, using its institutions to establish sovereignty, and taking advantage of its geostrategic position as a link between the Arab world and Africa, rather than as a battleground.
Skilful diplomacy, internal resilience, and the capacity to prevent foreign rivalries from overshadowing national objectives will determine whether Somalia becomes a stabilising player or a proxy battlefield.
Mohamed Hirsi Salad
Senior Security & Peace and Conflict Consultant to the Horn of Africa, a Security analyst, Counterterrorism Strategist & Secretary of former President of Somalia Dr Abdikasim Salad Hassan (TNG)
[email protected]
Twitter: @Mhirsisalad