Beled Hawo (Caasimada Online) – A deadly clash on Tuesday, July 22, between federal forces and Jubaland state troops in the contested border town of Balad Hawo has reignited one of Somalia’s most dangerous political rivalries. The fighting is the latest flare-up in a long-running standoff between Somalia’s central government in Mogadishu and the semi-autonomous Jubaland state.

Beneath the surface lies a more profound crisis over power-sharing, territorial control, and the unfinished federal constitution—an unresolved conflict that threatens to shatter the country’s fragile political progress and embolden the al-Shabaab insurgency.

The immediate flashpoint was the appointment of Abdirashid Janan—a deeply divisive figure—as head of the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) in the region.

Janan, a former Jubaland security minister, has been accused of serious human rights abuses by both the UN and Amnesty International. The federal government once arrested him, escaped from detention, and later led armed clashes against federal troops before his dramatic surrender in 2021.

His return to public office, now under the federal flag, was widely interpreted as a calculated move by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to assert direct control over the Gedo region and weaken Jubaland’s grip.

For Jubaland President Ahmed Madobe, the move was an unmistakable challenge—an attempt to undermine his authority in a region that has long been politically contentious. The town of Balad Hawo, located near the Kenyan border, has frequently served as the frontline in the broader struggle between federal ambitions and regional resistance.

Both sides issued contradictory narratives about Tuesday’s events. Jubaland officials accused the federal government of waging an “unjust war” on the town’s residents, claiming that their forces were acting in self-defense and had retaken control. Conversely, the federal Ministry of Internal Security blamed Madobe’s loyalists for a “blatant attack” on government barracks and public institutions, resulting in civilian and military casualties.

Who owns Gedo?

The battle for Balad Hawo reflects a much broader power struggle: Who truly governs Gedo?

Gedo has long been more than a geographic prize. Its location—at the tri-border intersection of Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia—gives it immense strategic value. But its political importance peaks during election cycles. The region holds a critical bloc of parliamentary seats, making it a decisive player in Somalia’s clan-based electoral system. Control over Gedo is not just about local dominance—it shapes who holds power in Mogadishu.

Former President Mohamed Abdullahi “Farmaajo” understood this well. His administration spent years attempting to sideline Madobe by installing loyalist officials in Gedo, which triggered a political and security standoff that nearly derailed the 2020–2021 national elections.

Now, under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, the federal government appears to be pursuing a similar path—using more institutional levers, but with the same end goal: to break Jubaland’s hold on the region.

However, the costs of this strategy are growing.

Clan grievances

What complicates the power struggle further is the deep resentment many Gedo clans hold toward Ahmed Madobe, despite his leadership of Jubaland.

Madobe’s base of support lies in Kismayo and the Lower Jubba region, where his allied clans dominate. In contrast, the Marehan clan, which is predominant in Gedo, has long viewed his administration with suspicion, accusing it of marginalization and neglect. Many in Gedo see Madobe as a distant ruler imposed from Kismayo—not a legitimate representative of their local interests.

This discontent intensified in 2024 when Jubaland’s parliament—widely seen as loyal to Madobe—extended his term for a third time. The move was declared illegal by the federal government and rejected by many in Gedo, where local elites saw it as another example of top-down rule.

Paradoxically, this has allowed Mogadishu’s efforts to gain some traction in Gedo, despite growing distrust of federal overreach. While Janan’s appointment sparked controversy, some residents welcomed the federal challenge to Madobe’s authority—not out of loyalty to the central government, but as a rejection of regional domination.

The divide between Gedo and Kismayo underscores a critical reality: Somalia’s federalism is fractured not only vertically—between Mogadishu and the states—but horizontally, within the member states.

A militarized constitution  

At the heart of this political turmoil is Somalia’s unfinished 2012 provisional constitution. It fails to clearly define the roles and powers of the federal government versus the Federal Member States (FMS), creating a legal vacuum that both sides exploit. With no agreed-upon framework for resolving disputes over territory or elections, Somalia’s politics increasingly default to armed confrontation.

Elite federal units such as the Gorgor and Haram’ad brigades, trained and equipped by international partners, were intended for national defense and counterterrorism. But in practice, they’ve been deployed in political hotspots like Gedo, where their actions are seen as part of Mogadishu’s campaign to control regional territory.

Jubaland has responded with its own Darawish forces, whose loyalty to Madobe runs deep—especially in Lower Jubba and Kismayo.

This parallel security buildup has created a zero-sum environment: each side’s preparations are viewed as existential threats by the other, making clashes like the one in Balad Hawo almost inevitable.

Meanwhile, al-Shabaab remains the biggest winner. The more time and energy federal and regional leaders spend fighting each other, the less capacity they have to combat the insurgency. Al-Shabaab exploits these governance vacuums, recruits from disillusioned communities, and reasserts itself in areas where state forces are absent—or preoccupied with internal rivalries.

Somalia cannot afford to keep handing the militants these opportunities.

A path forward

The Balad Hawo clash is not just another security incident—it is a warning. Without a clear constitutional settlement, genuine political dialogue, and trust-building between the center and the states, Somalia risks further deepening its fragmentation.

Finalizing the constitution must become a national priority. It should establish clear boundaries of authority, guarantee power-sharing mechanisms, and provide legal channels for dispute resolution. Somali leaders must also acknowledge and address the internal divisions within member states, like those between Gedo and Kismayo.

Military victories in towns like Balad Hawo will not determine Somalia’s future. It will be shaped by whether the country’s political class chooses to settle its disputes at the negotiating table—or continue to risk the nation’s unity on the battlefield.