Changing the U.S. Position on Somaliland — Who Is Behind? The UAE’s Role in Shaping Washington’s Shifting Posture.
Somaliland has been in the grey area of international politics for 30 years, living as a de facto state without proper recognition. Presenting itself as a stable democracy in an unstable area, it has maintained its own political institutions, army, currency, and foreign policy since its independence in 1991. Due to Somalia’s and the African Union’s (AU) steadfast adherence to the concept of territorial integrity within colonial boundaries, no UN member has officially acknowledged it.
But that story is starting to change. The period of automatic U.S. commitment to the “One Somalia” concept may be coming to an end, according to recent events in Washington, including declarations from U.S. legislators, discreet diplomatic contacts, and, most importantly, military interest in the port of Berbera. Optimism is on the rise in Somaliland’s capital, Hargeisa. Head of State Abdirahman “Irro” Abdullahi of Somaliland has even forecast that his country would gain global renown by the year 2028.
However, a geopolitical game far more intricate exists underlying these optimistic indications. Recognising Somaliland is about more than just democracy and stability; that is its essence. This is a game of ports, bases, and great power rivalry, and the UAE has been instrumental in subtly shifting Somaliland to the centre of the geostrategic struggle in the Horn of Africa.
The now-glaring issue is whether the concept of a “Great Somalia” would die out if the United States moves towards Somaliland. Why has President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s Somali Federal Government (FGS) not taken strong action to counter the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) overt meddling in Somaliland?
Somaliland and the long wait for recognition
Historical and legal grounds support Somaliland’s independence claim. It was once a British protectorate and had a short stint of independence in June 1960 before becoming the Somali Republic after combining with Italian Somalia. Supporters of Somaliland’s independence contend that the union was entirely consensual and that the 1991 declaration of independence, after the fall of the Somali state, was just a return to sovereignty.
Statehood without recognition is something that Somaliland has really accomplished, which is something that very few African post-colonial separatist efforts have been able to do. Unlike the persistent instability in southern Somalia, it has managed to hold a number of competitive elections, peacefully transfer power between competing political parties, and keep things relatively stable.
Their leaders claim that stability is unjustly punishing them. We are not requesting donations. An interview with a Somaliland minister revealed that the country’s leaders are pleading for the world to take reality into account.
But for a long time, the rest of the world has been reluctant, worried that recognising Somaliland might set off a chain reaction. As an example, separatist movements in Senegal and Biafra in Nigeria may look to Somaliland. The AU has long held that maintaining boundaries established under colonial rule is essential to the concept of post-independence states.
Like Somalia, Washington has stood firm, saying that the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty are non-negotiable.
Signs of a U.S. shift
Maybe that will change. U.S. signals since 2024 imply that Somaliland is becoming tougher to disregard.
A break with long-standing US policy, recognition of Somaliland was being considered by the Trump administration, according to recent remarks made by former president Donald Trump. Conservative lawmakers like Senator Ted Cruz have been vocal in their calls for Somaliland’s recognition, painting the country as a democratic partner in the fight against China. Go a step further; Rep. Scott Perry introduced a bill to officially acknowledge Somaliland’s independence.
Engagement on a Strategic Level: In June 2025, AFRICOM commander Gen. Michael Langley examined the Berbera runway on his visit to Hargeisa, which caused some concern in Mogadishu. The very presence of a U.S. general on Somaliland territory suggested strategic calculation, even if it was not formal acknowledgement.
Consideration of China: In a move that directly ties the importance of Somaliland to the United States’ rivalry with Beijing, the House Select Committee on China recommended that the State Department establish an office in Hargeisa.
These developments point to Somaliland’s emergence in the United States’ strategic thinking as a real player in the great power competition, rather than only a moral issue of self-determination.
Why Berbera matters
The port of Berbera is essential to Somaliland’s recent rise to prominence. With the help of Emirati investment, the formerly Cold War outpost Berbera is today one of the most important strategic assets in the Horn of Africa.
New container terminals, increased port capacity, and modern roadways connecting Berbera to Ethiopia were all part of the $442 million investment by the UAE via DP World. Foreign companies have started flocking to a neighbouring economic zone.
Washington sees Berbera as a kind of insurance. Camp Lemonnier, located in Djibouti, is the only permanent U.S. military installation in Africa at the moment. On the other hand, China established its first overseas military post in Djibouti in 2017. Because they are so close to each other, the two bases pose a threat of conflict.
The risks of depending only on Djibouti were highlighted in 2018 by a laser strike on American pilots that was believed to have been carried out by China. In contrast, Berbera provides an alternate base of operations, allowing the United States to have “strategic depth” in the area.
Thus, whereas Somaliland presents recognition as an ethical dilemma, Washington views it as an issue of military preparedness and counter-China strategy.
The UAE’s hidden hand
The United Arab Emirates has played a more significant role than any other player in the rise of Somaliland. Abu Dhabi has made Somaliland an integral part of its Horn of Africa strategy for the last decade.
The UAE’s state-linked logistics powerhouse, DP World Investment, was instrumental in turning Berbera port into a world-class centre. Somaliland is becoming a major player in global commerce and logistics because of this investment.
Military Implications: The United Arab Emirates has long considered Berbera as a possible base for its naval and air logistical operations in the area, especially in Yemen. During the height of the Yemen conflict, Emirati soldiers reportedly exploited Berbera facilities.
The United Arab Emirates has used diplomatic leverage to get Washington and other capitals to see Hargeisa as an ally by bringing Somaliland into high-level geopolitical talks.
It is crucial to note that Mogadishu has not put up significant opposition to the influence of the UAE.
Where is the Somali Federal government?
Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s leadership, the Somali Federal Government (FGS) has been vocal in its opposition to Ethiopia’s 2024 pact with Somaliland, which provided recognition in return for coastline access, but has been noticeably quiet over the UAE’s ongoing involvement.
Hassan Sheikh has not done anything against the UAE, so why not? There are a number of possible reasons:
Gulf States Dependency: Gulf players continue to have a great deal of influence on Somalia’s politics and economy. Mogadishu finds it difficult to turn off the UAE’s financial help, political backing, and diaspora networks. Challenging one another head-on could deplete vital resources.
The FGS has a hard enough time establishing its control over the other member states of the federal government without having to worry about Somaliland completely. Mogadishu does not possess the united political will necessary to confront the UAE.
Maintaining Neutrality in the Gulf Rivalry Between the UAE and Saudi Arabia and Qatar and Turkey is an Axis that Hassan Sheikh has sought to balance diplomatically. Attacking Abu Dhabi’s Somaliland initiative head-on might make Somalia even more reliant on Doha and Ankara, a delicate balance he does not seem prepared to give up.
The FGS focuses on counterinsurgency and security stabilisation since Al-Shabab is still dominating large parts of southern Somalia. Priorities in the battle against terrorism take precedence over concerns over Somaliland recognition.
People who disagree with Hassan Sheikh say that his leadership has been characterised by short-term survival rather than long-term strategy. His lack of political will and regional connections makes it unlikely that he will be able to successfully challenge the UAE.
By remaining silent, Mogadishu effectively allowed Abu Dhabi to fill the void, much to Somaliland’s advantage.
Risks of recognition
There would be far-reaching effects for Somalia and the rest of the Horn of Africa if the US officially recognised Somaliland.
The “Great Somalia” Collapse Forever lost would be the long-sought goal of Somali unity, which would include the entire Somali diaspora in Ethiopia and Kenya as well as the cities of Mogadishu and Hargeisa. As a symbol, recognition would put a stop to Somali irredentism.
The precedent set by recognition might provide a boost to separatist groups all throughout Africa, from Biafra to Cabinda. This snowball effect is the exact reason the African Union has always been against Somaliland’s cause.
The political instability in Somalia would worsen as a result of international recognition. There is a risk that the already precarious federalism may fall apart, giving areas like Puntland and Jubaland the confidence to seek independence.
Conflicts in the Horn of Africa might break out as a result of regional instability, as shown in Ethiopia’s recognition-for-access arrangement with Somaliland.
The advances made in the fight against terrorism might be undermined if the Somali state were to become weaker due to internal strife over recognition, giving Al-Shabab more autonomy.
Between symbolism and strategy
After decades of marginalisation, Somaliland would finally feel vindicated with U.S. recognition. It would strengthen its position in the global system and accelerate its economic aspirations.
On the other hand, Washington sees recognition as more of a strategic tool to resist China, increase redundancy outside Djibouti, and reward a “democracy partner”. Rather than an ideal about concepts.
But abandoning the AU and further destabilising Somalia would come at a high price. U.S. officials will likely maintain their current approach of ambiguity, strengthening informal links with Somaliland without formally recognising the country.
Conclusion: The death of “Great Somalia”?
The idea of Somaliland being recognised is no longer just a thought. Somaliland has been relentlessly campaigning for this for the past three decades, and the confluence of strategic interests in the United States, funding from the Emiratis, and other factors has pushed it closer than ever before.
But this course of action poses an existential threat to Somalia. Acknowledgement would do double damage: it would put an end to dreams of a “Great Somalia” and further isolate Mogadishu from its own region.
It is clear that Somalia’s diplomacy and sovereignty are weak since President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has failed to challenge the UAE’s move. Mogadishu has enabled Somaliland’s recognition movement to gain unstoppable speed by putting foreign assistance needs and short-term survival ahead of strategic aggressiveness.
The symbolic transition is already in motion, regardless of whether the United States legally recognises Somaliland. As a “passport to the globe”, Hargeisa’s port of Berbera shines. Silence and reluctance are more powerful than outright opposition in Mogadishu.
So, we still do not know whether future recognition would be greeted with joy as a victory for self-determination or with sadness as the end of Great Somalia.
Mohamed Hirsi Salad: Senior Security & Peace and Conflict Consultant to the Horn of Africa, a Security analyst, Counterterrorism Strategist & secretary of former President of Somalia Dr Abdikasim Salad Hassan (TNG)
[email protected]
Twitter: @Mhirsisalad
