Hargeisa, Somalia — A reported US push to reopen ties with Eritrea has dealt a fresh strategic blow to Somaliland, the breakaway region of Somalia, by undermining the argument Hargeisa has tried to sell for months in Washington: that the self-declared republic is the most useful new American partner on the Red Sea.
The Wall Street Journal reported that the Trump administration is exploring a reset with Eritrea, including the possible easing of some sanctions. The shift comes as Washington reassesses Red Sea security amid Iranian pressure on maritime routes and persistent Houthis threats near the Bab al-Mandeb.
At the very moment Somaliland has been marketing Berbera as an answer to US anxieties over shipping lanes, the administration appears to be studying a different route through a recognised state with a long Red Sea coastline.
That shift matters because Somaliland’s recent diplomacy has rested heavily on geography.
Its officials and supporters have argued that Berbera’s port, long runway and position near the Gulf of Aden make it a natural alternative to Djibouti as US concerns deepen over the Red Sea, Yemen and Iran.
But if Washington is now considering Eritrea instead, then Somaliland’s claim to be uniquely placed begins to look much weaker.
Eritrea offers a strategic coastline without forcing the United States into the legal and diplomatic complications of openly embracing a breakaway region that is part of Somalia.
Within the state system
The problem for Somaliland is not only that Eritrea has entered the picture. It is that the broader US signal has become less favourable to Hargeisa’s central message.
Fox News reported on April 13 that a State Department spokesperson reaffirmed US recognition of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia, including Somaliland. Separately, an AFRICOM spokesperson said Washington is not seeking to establish new basing.
Those are not minor details. They strike directly at the two ideas that have powered Somaliland’s campaign: that the United States could soon want Berbera for military purposes, and that strategic urgency might push Washington closer to political recognition.
The significance of that position is greater because the United States already has a major military platform in the region.
Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti remains the primary base of operations for the US Africa Command in the Horn of Africa. That means Washington is not looking for an entry point from scratch. It already has one.
The issue is whether it wants additional leverage and flexibility as the Red Sea grows more volatile. If Eritrea can offer part of that through state-to-state engagement, Somaliland becomes less essential to US planning than its advocates have suggested.
That is the deeper strategic setback for Hargeisa. Somaliland has tried to argue that the Red Sea crisis has made it unavoidable. The Eritrea track suggests the opposite.
Washington may still see value in Somaliland’s geography, but it is also showing that it prefers to test options that do not immediately trigger a recognition dispute, a clash with Mogadishu or a broader regional backlash over borders in the Horn of Africa.
In hard geopolitical terms, Eritrea offers the United States a route to greater Red Sea access without forcing a decision on Somaliland’s status.
Mogadishu’s regional backers
For Somalia’s federal government, this is a political and diplomatic gain.
Mogadishu’s core argument has long been that outside powers can pursue shipping, security, and Red Sea interests without infringing on Somali sovereignty.
The current US posture appears to support that case rather than weaken it. Washington has not endorsed a new base in Somaliland and has restated Somalia’s territorial integrity. It is reportedly examining Eritrea through official channels rather than moving toward a break with the established regional order.
The timing also works in Mogadishu’s favour because Somalia is backed by three regional powers with weight in Washington: Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Türkiye.
Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan said in February that Israel’s recognition of Somaliland would benefit neither Somaliland nor the Horn of Africa. A Saudi-Turkish joint statement issued the same month reaffirmed support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Somalia.
Egypt has taken the same line. Last week, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi received Trump adviser Massad Boulos in Cairo.
The Egyptian presidency said Boulos conveyed President Donald Trump’s appreciation and stressed the importance of continued coordination and consultation between Cairo and Washington.
That does not prove Saudi Arabia, Egypt or Türkiye dictated Washington’s Eritrea thinking. But it does suggest the White House has strong reasons to factor in the preferences of three regional powers aligned with Mogadishu and carrying real weight in its wider Middle East diplomacy.
Egypt, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia are all important players in the broader regional effort to contain escalation involving Iran and the United States.
In that context, Washington may not need to be lobbied directly on every Horn of Africa file to take their views seriously. It may simply judge that on matters touching the Red Sea, Gulf security and the Horn, their preferences carry strategic value.
Wider regional contest
The UAE sits on the other side of that equation. Abu Dhabi has long had a strategic stake in Somaliland through Berbera and its wider commercial and security footprint in the Horn.
Somalia moved in January to annul all agreements with the United Arab Emirates, including port deals and defence and security cooperation, accusing Abu Dhabi of undermining Somali sovereignty. DP World’s major investment in Berbera, however, remained in place.
That rupture matters because it reinforced the view in Mogadishu that Somaliland’s external push was not unfolding in isolation, but alongside Emirati interests built up over years of investment and influence in Berbera.
That wider regional contest sharpens the contrast now facing Washington.
On one side stand Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Türkiye, all publicly aligned with Mogadishu on Somalia’s territorial integrity and all important to US regional calculations.
On the other is an Emirati footprint that expanded through Berbera and helped make Somaliland more attractive to outside powers in the first place.
Against that backdrop, a US turn toward Eritrea looks even more damaging to Somaliland’s case. It suggests Washington is looking for Red Sea leverage without taking on the political baggage attached to Somaliland’s disputed status.
Geography is not enough
None of this means Somaliland has lost all strategic relevance. Berbera still has obvious military and commercial value. US officials may continue to quietly assess it, and Somaliland will keep arguing that its relative stability and location make it an attractive partner.
But the latest reporting has changed the balance of the story.
The US military is publicly saying it is not seeking new basing. The State Department is publicly restating Somalia’s territorial integrity. And the administration is reportedly examining Eritrea as a way to strengthen its Red Sea posture through a recognised state rather than a breakaway region.
For Somaliland, that is a sobering message. Strategic geography can open doors, but it does not, by itself, override the logic of recognition, existing military infrastructure, and regional diplomacy.
For Mogadishu, however, the picture is far more encouraging. Washington is pursuing Red Sea security through Djibouti, Cairo and now possibly Eritrea, while keeping close to regional powers that back Somalia’s unity. That makes it much harder for Somaliland to argue that America needs to go through Hargeisa first.
