Berlin, Germany — A German policy paper has offered one of the clearest mappings yet of the United Arab Emirates’ expanding footprint in Somalia, showing how ports, security forces and regional alliances have anchored the Horn of Africa nation in Abu Dhabi’s wider continental strategy.
The report by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) examines the UAE’s activities across Sudan, Libya, Ethiopia, and Somalia. It highlights how commercial investments and security partnerships often overlap with conflict dynamics and fragile state authority.
In Somalia, the findings focus heavily on two strategic coastal hubs: Berbera in the unrecognised breakaway region of Somaliland, and Bosaso in the semi-autonomous state of Puntland. Both sit along the Gulf of Aden, one of the world’s busiest maritime corridors, and both are deeply tied to Emirati commercial and security interests.
For Mogadishu, the report cuts to the heart of a long-running dispute with Abu Dhabi and Somalia’s own regional leaders: who holds the constitutional authority to sign foreign agreements on ports, security and strategic infrastructure?
The issue, Somali officials have repeatedly warned, goes beyond investment. It is a matter of national sovereignty.
A coastline of influence
The report places Somalia’s northern coastline within a vast Emirati network stretching from the Gulf to the Red Sea and into several African conflict zones, where Abu Dhabi has built ties with local authorities, armed factions and security institutions.
It identifies Somaliland and Puntland as crucial nodes. Their political status differs: Somaliland declared independence in 1991, while Puntland remains a federal state that often clashes with the central government. But both offer the UAE strategic footholds in areas where Mogadishu’s federal government has limited control.
The SWP paper also shows how Somalia’s internal divisions have created openings for external powers seeking influence through port concessions, security cooperation and direct diplomatic relations with regional administrations.
That approach has strengthened Abu Dhabi’s role along a maritime route vital to global trade and Gulf security, while placing the UAE at the centre of one of Somalia’s most sensitive domestic disputes.
Berbera and Bosaso
Berbera stands as the most visible symbol of the UAE’s presence in Somaliland. Dubai-based port operator DP World has invested heavily to turn the facility into a major commercial hub in the Gulf of Aden.
For Somaliland, the project carries both economic and political weight, strengthening its claim that it can enter international agreements as an independent state despite Mogadishu’s objections.
For the UAE, Berbera secures a strategic vantage point near the Bab al-Mandab strait, a critical maritime chokepoint linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden.
Bosaso gives the UAE a second foothold. A DP World subsidiary holds a long-term concession at the Puntland port, while Abu Dhabi has also been linked to backing for the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF).
The UAE originally helped create the PMPF at the height of the Somali piracy crisis, and the German paper places the force within a broader pattern of Emirati support for local security actors in fragile states.
This dynamic remains highly contentious. Somalia’s federal government insists that all foreign defence and port agreements must go through Mogadishu, a mandate that regional authorities routinely bypass as they pursue their own partnerships.
Sudan link
The report’s most sensitive section examines the possible use of Somalia’s northern coast in connection with the devastating war in Sudan, where the UAE faces persistent allegations of backing the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
The paper notes that Bosaso not only served as a base for UAE support for Puntland’s maritime force, but also featured in reported movements of weapons from Yemen and Colombian mercenaries tied to the RSF.
It also says military equipment reportedly intended for the RSF appears to have passed through Berbera before being rerouted via an Ethiopian military base.
These findings tie Somalia’s coastline to a brutal conflict in which UN experts, Western governments and rights groups have accused the RSF of mass killings, sexual violence and ethnic cleansing.
The UAE has strongly denied arming the RSF and says its role in Sudan is strictly humanitarian and diplomatic. The SWP paper acknowledges that denial, while still framing Abu Dhabi’s African footprint as deeply enmeshed in conflict politics.
For Somalia, the suggestion that strategic locations on its territory may have helped fuel a foreign war is politically explosive.
Federal fault lines
The report arrives at a precarious moment for Somali-Emirati relations. In January, Mogadishu announced the cancellation of all agreements with Abu Dhabi, including port, defence and security arrangements.
Somaliland, Puntland, and the southern state of Jubbaland rejected the move, vowing to maintain their ties with the UAE and exposing the depth of Somalia’s unresolved federal crisis over foreign policy and strategic assets.
Mogadishu insists foreign policy and national defence fall exclusively under federal jurisdiction. Regional administrations argue that they retain the right to pursue economic and security partnerships that serve local interests.
The SWP paper does not resolve this constitutional clash, but it shows how foreign partnerships can reshape power dynamics inside fragile states.
In Somalia, a port deal is rarely just a commercial transaction. It is a stress test for federal authority, regional autonomy and national sovereignty.
A broader pattern
The German paper does not treat Somalia in isolation. It places the country alongside Sudan, Libya and Ethiopia, where the UAE has forged ties with local or national actors involved in major conflicts.
Abu Dhabi’s links to Khalifa Haftar’s forces in Libya and the RSF in Sudan involve open warfare, but its strategy in Somalia differs. There is no single nationwide war comparable to Sudan; rather, it is a long-running struggle over federal authority, regional power, and territorial control.
That makes Somalia a distinct but critical part of the UAE’s Africa strategy, focused less on battlefield support and more on securing ports, access and long-term regional influence.
The report issues a clear warning: such relationships can embolden local actors, complicate state-building efforts and deepen fault lines in countries where central authority is already contested.
